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JOHN B E R K M A N 
Truth and Martyrdom: 
The Structure of Discipleship 
in Veri tat is Sp lendor 
Early in February, I was privileged to participate in a gathering 
of forty-five predominantly Catholic philosophers and theologians 
to discuss John Paul II's Veritatis Splendor. The lead paper by one 
of this country's most prominent Catholic philosophers was 
excellent, as was the ensuing discussion. Most of this discussion 
focused on the second of the encyclical's three chapters, the chapter 
that deals with "some trends of theological thinking and certain 
philosophical affirmations [that] are incompatible with revealed 
truth" (§29). What to my mind was conspicuously missing from the 
day's discussion was any attention devoted to either the first or 
(especially) the third chapters of the encyclical. The first chapter is 
a study of the nature of Christian discipleship, examined through 
the lens of St. Matthew's account of Jesus' meeting with the rich 
young man (Matthew 19). The third chapter is largely a discussion 
of the significance of Christian martyrdom. In the course of the 
discussion that day, the issue of discipleship was mentioned rarely, 
and the subject of martyrdom never came up. In concentrating 
almost exclusively on the second chapter, the group did not even 
attempt to locate the encyclical's critique of particular "trends of 
theological thinking and certain philosophical affirmations" within 
the context provided by Veritatis Splendor, namely that of Christian 
discipleship. In doing so this group mirrored much of the general 
response to Veritatis Splendor, which has been to focus almost 
exclusively on the second chapter. It is my goal to try to shift this 
focus, and to highlight the primacy of discipleship for rightly 
understanding Veritatis Splendor. 
In Veritatis Splendor, the Pope is trying to tell us something 
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about a notion that is central to our lives: freedom. The argument 
is that freedom must be connected with the pursuit of truth. Since 
it is the truth that sets us free (§55), "genuine freedom involves 
seeking the truth and adhering to it once it is found" (§56). This 
point resonates with one made in the song "Me and Bobby 
McGee," written by Kris Kristofferson and sung by Janis Joplin. 
(I might add as an aside the Kristofferson was a bright guy, having 
been a Rhodes Scholar before getting into the singing and acting 
business.) In "Me and Bobby McGee," Kristofferson writes 
"freedom's just another word for nothing left to lose." The notion 
of freedom that Kristofferson is criticizing is a peculiarly modern 
one, which emphasizes "freedom from" (e.g., any particular 
demand or constraint) rather than "freedom for" (e.g., the pursuit 
of the true, the good, and the beautiful). This modern notion of 
freedom as "freedom from" is what both Kris Kristofferson and 
John Paul II are challenging. 
The modern notion of freedom as "freedom from" is 
exemplified by those Americans who oppose government subsidized 
universal medical coverage or are against gun control because 
America ought to be a "free" country. For these people, it doesn't 
matter whether they or their neighbors actually have a gun, or can 
actually obtain access to basic medical care, but that everybody is 
free to buy a gun or seek medical care without government 
constraints. As Kristofferson observes in "Me and Bobby McGee," 
for 40 million poor Americans who can't afford medical coverage, 
and for the poor generally, this '"freedom from" is what you have 
when you in reality have nothing, and serves as a kind of delusion 
for those who live in the reality of actually having nothing. Thus, 
this freedom is simply having nothing left to lose. 
Kristofferson's depiction of modern freedom as that state in 
which you have "nothing left to lose" is strikingly similar to the 
notion of freedom as "doing whatever one wants" which Veritatis 
Splendor criticizes. One comes to understand freedom as "doing 
whatever one wants" when freedom no longer has a goal or a telos, 
when there is no longer anything sacred, anything with intrinsic and 
inalienable worth and dignity, when freedom is no longer ordered 
to the pursuit of the true, the good, and the beautiful. In insisting 
that freedom is only found within the bounds of truthfulness, 
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Veritatis Splendor quotes the words of Jesus that "You will know 
the truth, and the truth will set you free" (§34). 
The reader will notice the negative note thus far, a discussion 
of what is not being affirmed in Veritatis Splendor. In doing so I 'm 
following the approach of many commentators on the encyclical. 
But if I were to continue to focus on what Veritatis Splendor 
criticizes, I would fail to capture the central, constructive vision of 
the Christian life at the heart of Veritatis Splendor. This vision is 
presented in the form of the question the rich young man asks Jesus 
in the 19th chapter of St. Matthew's gospel: "Teacher, what good 
must I do to have eternal life?" (§8). Jesus first responds by telling 
the young man to keep the commandments, a response sometimes 
interpreted to legitimate a "minimalist" understanding of Christian 
morality. The young man does not leave the matter here, and 
neither, emphasizes Veritatis Splendor, should we. We, like the 
young man, must probe further. When the young man does this, he 
is told by Jesus "If you wish to be perfect, go, sell your posses-
sions and give the money to the poor, and you will have treasure in 
heaven; then come, follow me" (§16). Here we have arrived at the 
heart of Veritatis Splendor. While the commandments are conditions 
for full life in Christ, they are not the heart of life in Christ (§17). 
The Christian life is not fundamentally about what rules and 
principles one must follow to be in the good graces of God and 
God's church. Rather, the heart of the Christian life is about 
discipleship, following Jesus when, and as, and how Jesus calls us. 
Too often, the following of rules and principles degenerates into 
what is often called a "minimalist" Christian morality. This 
truncated vision of Christian life sees most of the practice of life as 
morally neutral, to be done with as we please, as long as we stay 
on the right side of rules x, y, and z. This understanding of 
Christian life is not only not the good news of Jesus, it is not even 
a correct understanding of the Decalogue. The ten commandments 
are not a self-contained code of moral principles, but a response in 
gratitude by God's people to God's deliverance of them out of 
slavery and bondage: 
The moral life presents itself as the response due 
to the many gratuitous initiatives taken by God out 
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of love for humans. It is a response of love, 
according to the statement made in Deuteronomy 
about the fundamental commandment: "Hear, O 
Israel: The Lord our God is one Lord; and you 
shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, 
and with all your soul, and with all your might. 
And these words which I command you this day 
shall be upon your heart; and you shall teach them 
diligently to your children" (Dt. 6:4-7). Thus the 
moral life, caught up in the gratuitousness of 
God's love, is called to reflect his glory: "For the 
one who loves God it is enough to be pleasing to 
the one whom he loves: for no greater reward 
should be sought than that love itself; charity in 
fact is of God in such a way that God himself is 
charity." (§10) 
Obedience to the ten commandments is only properly under-
stood as a desire to honor God, to be like God. It is to this goal that 
the commandments serve to assist, to enable disciples. The 
commands themselves are justified in terms of Israel's ongoing 
relationship with their God, and thus are told "You shall be holy, 
for I the Lord your God am holy" (§10). 
Although we may be tempted, perhaps we have even been told, 
that Christian life consists primarily in the fulfillment of the rules 
of God and the church, Veritatis Splendor insists that this view is 
deformed and will never make sense of the Christian gospel as 
really being good news. What is important is not any moralistic 
minimum, but responding to the call of Jesus which goes out to the 
rich young man, the call of "Come, follow me," which is "the 
new law of the church and of every Christian (§114). 
It is to be inspired to follow Christ that enables the Christian to 
live faithfully. Thus, near the end of the encyclical, the Christian 
life is summarized as "abandoning oneself to [Jesus], in letting 
oneself be transformed by his grace and renewed by his mercy, 
gifts which come to us in the living communion of his church" 
(§119). Only when the Christian's gaze is affixed upon Christ, and 
the gifts of the Holy Spirit invoked to live out that journey, can the 
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demands of Christian faith not become onerously burdensome. 
Thus, in trying to understand Christian morality, the first questions 
are: Are we followers of Christ? Do our lives come from God, 
depend on God, and pursue a return to God? Is God our source and 
God our goal? 
At present, too much debate about the Christian life focuses on 
specifying and nuancing "how we must do x and not do y " 
("follow the commandments") without locating this debate within 
the context of how Christ is faithfully followed? ("Come, follow 
me"). It is only when the former is firmly located in the context of 
the latter that the gospel truly functions as good news for the 
Christian. 
This brings us back to where we began, to the true meaning of 
freedom for Christians. Christians cannot understand "freedom" as 
freedom from any constraints, such that the demands of the gospel 
are seen as unreasonable demands upon our life, liberty, and 
happiness. That is not Christian freedom. Christian freedom begins, 
as St Augustine notes, " to be free from crimes . . . such as 
murder, adultery, fornication, theft, fraud, sacrilege and so forth. 
. . . But this is only the beginning of freedom, not perfect freedom 
(§13). Following rules can enable us to avoid evil, but perfect 
freedom lies in the active pursuit of our true good. Our true good 
lies in our pursuit of God in the path of true righteousness. 
Faithfulness to God is faithfulness to the truth, and that truth can 
never be alien to our freedom. Having emphasized this, let not a 
hint of antinomianism enter here. The path of perfection in our 
journey toward God cannot be navigated properly without a 
knowledge of the basic perils to be avoided. Thus, Veritatis 
Splendor quotes Augustine again, that " to the extent to which we 
serve God we are free, while to the extent that we follow the law 
of sin, we are still slaves" (§17). Once we are captured by the 
gospel, impelled to live it out, its demands become freedom. For 
"those who are impelled by love and 'walk by the spirit' (Gal. 
5:16), and who desire to serve others, find in God's law the 
fundamental and necessary way in which to practice love as 
something freely chosen and freely lived out" (§18). 
How, then, is this to be lived out? Are there not numerous 
contemporary problems which Jesus simply does not address 
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directly by his life? Do we not need universal precepts to apply the 
gospel to these situations? Again, I have no wish to deny the need 
for or place of moral precepts, but if we wish to follow faithfully 
Jesus' call to "Come, follow me," there is a wisdom needed that 
is more basic than knowledge of precepts, there is a form of 
guidance that is more sure than the precepts outlined by moral 
theologians. Those who put into practice most faithfully the faith of 
Christ are the examples to whom Christians first turn for guidance. 
It is in God's faithful people, the body of Christ, that we see Christ 
in action. And the body of Christ is best revealed in the lives of the 
saints and the sacrifices of Christian martyrs. Although there is 
certainly a place and a need for moral principles, what is of 
primary importance is the vision of the imitation of Christ, 
following the example of Jesus and that of his faithful body as 
exemplified by the saints and martyrs. 
Of Veritatis Splendor's three chapters, the second (and longest) 
(§28-83) is devoted to a discussion of "some trends of theological 
thinking and certain philosophical affirmations [that] are 
incompatible with revealed truth" (§29). The central tenet of these 
trends is the denial of the existence of intrinsically wrong acts that 
can be absolutely prohibited (§75). While Veritatis Splendor 
criticizes these trends on a number of fronts, the most important 
criticism, as I see it, is that the denial of the existence of 
intrinsically evil acts renders the wisdom in the lives of the saints 
and the deaths of martyrs profoundly suspect (§92): 
The unacceptability o f . . . ethical theories, which 
deny the existence of negative moral norms regard-
ing certain kinds of behavior, norms which are 
valid without exception, is confirmed in a particu-
larly eloquent way by Christian martyrdom. (§90) 
For if there are no intrinsically wrong acts, if the Tightness or 
wrongness of an act is determined, as consequentialism advances, 
through a weighing of pre-moral goods and evils, then the witness 
of the martyrs could be undermined by a revision in the weighing 
of the pre-moral goods, which concludes that more good could have 
been gained if the martyr had sinned and saved his or her life. 
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Veritatis Splendor appeals to the inviolability of the witness of the 
martyrs to make sense of and justify the absolute prohibition of 
certain acts as intrinsically evil. The "never-torbe-done" nature of 
these wrong acts is manifested in the witness of the martyrs. 
It is possible, and in some contexts appropriate, to sum up this 
point in the moral maxim "i t is better to suffer wrong than to do 
wrong." However, this point is made most deeply and profoundly 
not in any moral maxim but in the lives and deaths of the martyrs. 
Faithful believers often faced martyrdom because they were 
unwilling to do certain acts, even at the cost of their lives — even 
at the cost of their children's lives. If we do not acknowledge the 
absolute wrongness of certain acts, then it no longer makes sense 
unconditionally to revere the martyrs as guides for Christians. 
Thus, Veritatis Splendor (§91) discusses the story of Susanna 
(Daniel 13), the witness in the death of John the Baptist (Mark 6), 
the martyrdoms of the deacon Stephen and the apostle James (Acts 
6-7; 12), and the countless others who accepted martyrdom rather 
than perform evil acts, such as idolatrously burning incense before 
the statue of the Emperor (Revlation 13). To take just one 
contemporary example, consider the death of Oscar Romero. If we 
could conclude that a more muted criticism of the El Salvadoran 
military would have significantly lengthened his life, and that in so 
doing pre-moral goods could have been better maximized, would 
that make his death foolishness? Passing by the question of the very 
commensurability of consequences in such a scenario, suffering to 
honor God and God's way with the world will always be 
foolishness to the Greeks, to those without the wisdom of the saints. 
So what are some acts that are always wrong? According to the 
emphases of Veritatis Splendor, contemporary idolatry is likely to 
come in economic and political forms. Here are some examples 
given: "Enterprises which for any reason — selfish or ideological, 
commercial or totalitarian — lead to the enslavement of human 
beings, buying or selling them like merchandise" or "reducing 
persons by violence to use-value or a source of profit" (§100). 
These and all other acts which are contrary to the dignity of human 
beings are intrinsically evil. If you find the above examples overly 
general, obscure, or somehow hard to follow, and thus doubt their 
"intrinsically evil" or "never-to-be-done" character, let me give 
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you a more specific example of an act which is always wrong: 
taking a water hose, putting it well down someone's throat, and 
turning on the water full blast until you blow out their guts. That's 
always wrong! 
What are some of the consequences of failing to acknowledge 
that certain acts are always and intrinsically wrong, of denying that 
we can adequately articulate aspects of the moral truth that is God, 
the source of all goodness and truth? One common result, which we 
see all too often, is the surrender of human persons to economic 
and political interests. Thus, 
if one does not acknowledge transcendent truth, 
then the force of power takes over and each person 
tends to make full use of the means at his disposal 
in order to impose his own interests or his own 
opinion, with no regard for the rights of 
others . . . (§99) 
Of course, these are generally the interests of government 
leaders or others in places and/or positions of power. All 
governments which deny the transcendent source of true good and 
the transcendent basis for the dignity of the human person tend 
towards totalitarianism. Veritatis Splendor notes that Marxism has 
been the foremost of these totalitarian conceptions, but also 
emphasizes the totalitarian nature of governments which ally 
democracy and moral relativism: "As history demonstrates, a 
democracy without values easily turns into open or thinly disguised 
totalitarianism" (§101). In our contemporary situation, we have 
more reason to fear democratic totalitarianism than Marxist 
totalitarianism. 
Finally, in thinking about Christian morality, Christians must 
be careful not to say something along the lines of "Well, we don't 
do these things because we believe in 'faith' rather than 'reason.' " 
Christians must make no opposition between reason and Christian 
faith. All moral truth is from God. God's demands and commands 
can never be alienating, because the call of God is always for the 
true good. If we find the demands of the gospel alienating, if grace 
corrects our moral reasoning, it is surely not because grace is in 
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opposition to our nature. Rather, it will be that we have failed as 
moral reasoners. 
Without a commitment to the view that there are intrinsically 
evil acts that can never be right, we cannot ultimately justify, nor 
even make sense of, the great acts of the saints and heroic sacrifices 
of Christian martyrs. If none of the demands of Christian life are 
categorical, then we will be unable to explain how it might be 
incumbent upon some Christians to undergo martyrdom. 
Furthermore, we cannot make sense of the life and death of the 
example for all Christian martyrs, namely the death and 
resurrection of Our Lord. For in Jesus' dying we learn that we must 
hold fast to doing no evil, that we must suffer evil rather than do 
violence. The willingness to do evil, namely to harm an innocent 
person, is exemplified by Caiaphas, the one who condemns Jesus, 
saying that it is better to make one innocent person suffer for the 
benefit of others (John 18:14). 
Although in refusing to do evil Christians may be called to 
suffer greatly, Christians know that God vindicates this manner of 
life. In resurrecting Jesus, God has told us definitively that it is in 
the unwillingness to do evil that true life is shown, that God honors 
and raises those faithful to God's peace and God's way of 
nonviolent love. We can thank John Paul II for reminding us of this 
in Veritatis Splendor. 
9
Berkman: Truth and Martyrdom
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 1994
